摘要
七七事变后日本全面侵华战争的决策过程相当复杂,影响因素很多。这其中既有长期的近代以来大陆政策的影响、九一八事变后日本膨胀的侵华野心,也有七七事变必然性和偶然性并存的特殊性。但根源还在于日本错误的对华认识及国际秩序观。这一错误集中表现为日本发动对华侵略战争的国家意志,但它的构成却是来自不同的影响国家决策的集团和个人。本文选取了军部特别是其“中国通”、政府首脑、智库三个样本,分析了他们的对华认识及国际秩序观是如何影响侵华战争的。轻视甚至蔑视中国社会的发展进步和中国政府及人民的抗战决心、建立以日本为霸主中国为附庸的东亚新秩序,是日本把七七事变扩大为全面侵华战争的主要原因,也是日本对华认识的主流和影响日本对华决策的主要因素。日本虽然也存在一些抱有对华客观认识的智库和明白人,但始终没能成为国家对华认识的主流,没能起到制止或中止日本对华侵略战争的作用。
After the July 7th Incident(七七事变)or the Marco Polo Bridge Incident(卢沟桥事变)in 1937,the decision-making process of the Japanese invasion of China was extremely complicated,impacted by various factors.They included the influence of Japan’s long-term Kontinental Politik(大陆政策),its inflating ambitions to invade China after the September 18 th Incident or the Manchurian Incident(九一八事变)in 1931,and the co-existence of inevitability and contingency concerning the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident itself.Nevertheless,the main reason behind was undoubtedly Japanese faulty knowledge of China and its view of international order,which eventually led to a national will to launch an aggressive war against China.However,the decision to launch the war was constructed by different groups and individuals,which took shape in different forms and comprehensively impacted the wartime decision-making process.This paper selects three samples respectively from the military division,especially its“China experts”,the head of government,and the think tank,intending to explore how their knowledge of China and view of international order influenced their aggressive war against China.The paper argues that the main reason why Japan expanded the scale of war from the Marco Polo Bridge Incident into the full-scale aggressive war against China,was closely related to Japanese under-estimation and ignorance of the development and progress of Chinese society,as well as the Chinese people’s determination to resist the Japanese invasion,along with Japan's intention to establish a new order in East A sia,which regarded Japan as a hegemony and China as a subsidiary.It was also the mainstream of Japanese knowledge of China and the main factor which influenced Japan’s decision making about China.Although there were some think tanks and individuals who possessed objective knowledge of China at that time,they failed to become the mainstream of Japan's national knowledge of China,and also failed to play the role of preventing or stopping Japan’s aggressive war against China.
作者
宋志勇
朱丁睿
Song Zhiyong;Zhu Dingrui(Japan Institute,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China;Department of History,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China)
出处
《北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第5期102-108,共7页
Journal of Peking University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目“日本全面侵华战争的决策问题研究”(项目编号:19ZDA220)阶段性研究成果。
关键词
全面侵华战争
对华认识
国际秩序
近卫文麿
中国抗战力调查
all-out War of Japanese Aggression Against China
knowledge of China
international order
Fumimaro Konoe(近卫文麿)
survey on China’s resistance capability