董事与经理兼任对企业风险承担水平的影响:基于高管激励的视角

The Influence of Director-manager Duality on Corporate Risk-taking:From the Perspective of Executive Incentive

以2007—2016年沪深A股非金融类上市公司为研究对象,实证检验我国上市公司董事与经理兼任对企业风险承担水平的影响。研究发现,董事与经理兼任能够显著提高企业的风险承担水平,且二者之间的关系在未实施股权激励、高管薪酬差距较大的情景下更为明显。进一步研究发现,董事与经理兼任和企业风险承担水平之间的作用机制符合“代理成本假说”,即在代理成本较高、董事会监督绩效较差的企业中董事与经理兼任对企业风险承担水平的影响更大。本文的研究结论从治理结构层面提供了企业组织结构安排与风险承担行为之间关系的经验证据,对于理解我国上市公司董事与经理兼任现象的经济后果具有重要的现实意义。

Taking the non-financial listed companies of A-share in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2016 as the research object,this paper empirically tested the influence of the director-manager duality of China’s listed companies on corporate risk-taking.This paper finds that director-manager duality can significantly improve the level of risk-taking in a company,and the relationship between the two is more obvious when equity incentive is not implemented and the gap in executive compensation is larger.Further research finds that the mechanism between the director-manager duality and the level of corporate risk-taking conforms to the agency cost hypothesis,that is,in the companies with higher agency cost and worse performance of board supervision,the director-manager duality has a greater influence on the level of corporate risk-taking.The research conclusion of this paper not only provides empirical evidence of the relationship between organizational structure arrangement and risk-taking behavior of a company from the perspective of executive incentive,but also has important practical significance for understanding the economic consequences of the phenomenon of director-manager duality in China’s listed companies.