限售股解禁与公司股份送转行为:基于交易所监管前后的比较

Share Lockups’ Expiration,Exchanges’ Supervision and Companies’ Stock Dividend Behavior

限售股解禁问题自股权分置改革基本完成后就一直困扰着国内A股市场,上市公司通过送转股份的方式配合解禁限售股股东高价减持成为一种屡试不爽的"割韭菜"策略。研究发现:限售股解禁规模越大,上市公司送转股份的可能性和送转的比例就越高,并且首发限售股解禁对公司股份送转行为的影响作用大于定增限售股解禁,而定增限售股解禁对公司股份送转行为的影响作用又大于其他限售股解禁。随着"高送转"之风不断蔓延,沪深交易所开始严格监管,各类限售股解禁对公司股份送转行为的影响作用因此而明显减弱,投资者的利益得到了更好的保护,促进了A股市场的健康发展。

The problem of the share lockups’ expiration has been affecting the domestic A-share market since the reform of non-tradable shares was basically completed.It has become a tried and tested strategy for the listed companies by distributing stock dividend to help the expired lockups’ shareholders to sell their shares at higher price.We find that the larger the scale of the share lockups’ expiration,the higher the possibility and the paying ratio of the stock dividends,and the effects of the IPO share lockups’ expiration on the companies’ stock dividend behavior are greater than that of the private placement lockups’ expiration and the effects of the private placement lockups’ expiration on the companies’ stock dividend behavior are greater than that of the other lockups’ expiration.In the case of the spread of the large stock dividend in the A-share market,Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges begin to strictly supervise this problem during the listed companies disclosing their 2016 annual reports.We find that the influences of the three kinds of the share lockups’ expiration on their companies’ stock dividend behavior have been obviously weakened since the supervision begins.Thus,the interests of minority shareholders are better protected,and the development of A-share market are better promoted.