不同付款模式下多供应商主导的垂直并购策略研究

Research on vertical M&A strategies of multi-supplier dominance under different payment modes

在考虑货币时间价值的情况下,研究不同付款方式的供应商与零售商垂直并购对供应链参与者的影响。通过建立单个零售商与不同付款模式供应商的斯塔克伯格博弈模型,分析、比较无并购情况与不同的并购情况来探究并购后的生产成本与生产、交易总时间对模型均衡解和各参与方利润的影响,并探究其是否存在帕累托改进区域。经过计算与参数赋值发现,在并购可以显著缩短生产和交易的总时间且无大幅增加生产成本的情况下,使用预付账款模式交易的供应商与零售商的并购能够使供应链所有参与方得到更高的利润,即实现帕累托优化。

Considering the time value of money,the impact of vertical mergers and acquisitions(M&As)between suppliers and retailers on supply chain participants are studied under different payment modes.Through the establishment of Stackelberg game model between single retailer and suppliers under different payment modes,the situation of no M&A and that of different M&As are analyzed and compared,so as to explore the influence of production cost,production and total transaction time on the equilibrium solution of the model and the profits of each participant after M&A,and whether there exists Pareto improvement area.After calculation and parameter assignment,it is found that under the condition that M&A can significantly shorten the total time of production and transaction without significantly increasing production costs,the M&A of suppliers and retailers using prepaid mode can make all participants in the supply chain more profitable,i.e.,Pareto optimization is realized.