基于演化博弈的偶发性强刺激对安全行为作用研究

Research on the Effect of Occasional Strong Stimulus on Production Safety Based on Evolutionary Game

为探究偶发性强刺激对工人和安全管理人员安全行为概率的影响规律,首先对双方的行为收益进行了分析,明确了企业安全生产中可能存在的演化博弈种类,然后使用MATLAB软件进行了模拟,展示了偶发性强刺激对不同种类演化博弈的影响。研究结果表明,企业实际存在的演化博弈可分为3类,10种;其中只有1种演化博弈情况中的工人和安全管理人员能长期维持刺激作用带来的改变。

In order to explore the rule of the impact of occasional strong stimulation on the probability of safety behavior of workers and safety managers,the paper first analyzes the behavior benefits of both sides,and defines the types of evolutionary games that may exist in the safety production of enterprises,then uses MATLAB to analyze,and simulates the impact of occasional strong stimulation on different types of evolutionary games.The results of the study show that the actual evolutionary games of enterprises can be divided into 3 categories and 10 types,among them,only one type of evolutionary game can be changed by workers and safety managers in the long term.