CEO道德风险与企业融资约束

CEO Moral Hazard and Corporate Financing Constraints

本文以2000-2018年沪市A股上市公司高级管理者为研究样本,以社会资本理论为研究基础,使用投资—现金流敏感度模型检验多种情况下CEO道德风险对企业融资约束的影响。实证结果表明,CEO的道德风险对企业融资具有负面效应,CEO道德风险越高,企业越难以获得融资;在CEO与董事长两职合一的情况下,CEO的道德风险问题依旧高比例存在;当CEO的权力被制衡后,道德风险有所下降,融资约束的情况得到缓解。本文在给出道德风险定量表达和深化融资约束理论的同时,结合社会资本理论对高层管理人员如何影响企业融资约束提供了一种新的解释,对如何加强上市公司治理及破解融资约束具有新的启示。

Taking the senior managers of A-share listed companies in Shanghai stock market from 2000 to 2018 as the research sample,this paper uses the theory of social capital as the research basis,and uses the investment-cash flow sensitivity model to test the influence of CEO moral hazard on corporate financing constraints in various situations.The empirical results show that CEO moral hazard has a negative effect on enterprise financing:the higher the CEO moral hazard is,the more difficult it is for the enterprise to obtain financing;in the case of the combination of CEO and chairman,the CEO moral hazard problem is still high;when the CEO′s power is balanced,moral hazard decreases and financing constraints are eased.This paper not only gives the quantitative expression of moral hazard and deepens the financing constraint theory,but also combines the social capital theory to provide a new explanation on how the senior managers affect the financing constraints of enterprises,and provides new enlightenment to how to strengthen the governance of listed companies and crack the financing constraints.