基于演化博弈理论的徽州非物质文化遗产可持续发展研究

Research on the Sustainable Development of Huizhou Intangible Cultural Heritage Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

为了明晰传承人和环境人在徽州非物质文化遗产可持续发展中的策略选择,构建了传承人和环境人演化博弈模型,利用复制动态方程求解演化博弈模型的局部均衡点,并对均衡点的稳定性进行了分析,最后利用仿真软件对传承人和环境人交互行为的演化路径进行了仿真。研究结果表明,徽州非物质文化遗产资源所隐藏的价值和环境人支付的初始成本直接决定了两者在演化博弈进程中的策略选择,同时超额收益的分配系数和环境人的惩罚系数也在一定程度上左右着系统的最终演化方向。

In view of a clarification of the strategy choice of inheritors and environmentalists in the sustainable development of intangible cultural heritage in Huizhou,an evolutionary game model of inheritors and environmentalists has thus been constructed,with the local equilibrium point of the evolutionary game model solved by copying the dynamic equation,followed by an analysis of the stability of the equilibrium point.Finally,the evolutionary path of interaction between environmentalists and inheritors is to be simulated by using the simulation software.The results show that the strategic choice of the two in the process of game can be directly determined by the hidden value of intangible cultural heritage resources in Huizhou and the initial cost paid by the environmentalists.Meanwhile,the distribution coefficient of excess income and the punishment coefficient of environmentalists also exert an influence on the direction of the final evolution of the system to a certain extent.