政府监管下既有住宅建筑节能改造市场主体行为策略分析

Analysis on Behavioral Strategy of Market Entities in Energy-Saving Renovation of Existing Residential Buildings under Government Supervision

既有住宅建筑节能改造市场有序运行需要政府宏观调控、市场供需主体协调配合,探索政府监管下业主和ESCO的行为演化策略对市场发展具有重要的理论意义和实践价值.从市场主体的行为策略分析入手,构建政府监管下业主与ESCO的演化博弈模型,运用进化博弈理论探讨业主和ESCO的动态演化过程与演化稳定策略.研究结果表明:政府监管力度、节能改造收益以及节能改造成本是影响博弈结果的关键因素,通过加大监管力度、提高收益、降低成本可优化业主和ESCO的行为选择.最后通过数值仿真验证模型推理结论并提出优化对策.

The orderly operation of the energy-saving renovation market of residential buildings requires the government's macro-control and the coordination of market supply and demand.Exploring the behavioral evolution strategies of the owners and ESCO under government supervision has important theoretical and practical value for market development.Starting from the analysis of behavioral strategies of market entities,this article constructed the evolutionary game model of owners and ESCO under government supervision and uses the evolutionary game theory to explore the dynamic evolution process and evolutionary stability strategy of owners and ESCO.The research results show that government supervision,energy-saving transformation income,and energy-saving transformation cost were the key factors affecting the outcome of the game.The owner and ESCO's behavior choices could be optimized by increasing supervision,improving revenue,and reducing costs.Finally,this article verified the deducted conclusion of the model by numerical simulation and proposes the optimization strategy.