基于双寡头竞争的航空客运模糊销售定价决策

Opaque Sales Pricing Decision of Airlines under Duopoly Competition

针对近年来航空公司机票销售领域流行的模糊分销模式,利用Hotelling模型建立了季末单一模糊销售以及直销与模糊销售共存的双寡头竞争模型,求解供大于求和供小于求下两种销售模式各利益主体的均衡价格及收益,旨在发现哪种销售模式更有利于提高航空公司的收益。研究表明,当市场竞争激烈时,模糊分销模式存在,且季末共同销售策略下航空公司的期望总收益高于单一模糊销售,同时模糊中介商有动力实施该模式,凸显了双渠道同期销售对市场需求的引导作用。该研究结果可为航空公司竞争环境下的均衡定价决策和销售模式选择提供理论参考。

Opaque sales is a popular strategy for selling leftover capacity in airline ticket sales and is in rapid development in recent years.The Hotelling model is used to establish two models,one in traditional opaque sales channel,the other in direct channel and opaque sales channel existing at the same time.Then,the equilibrium prices and benefits of airlines and intermediary in the two sales modes of supply and demand are solved,which is to find out when the airline is most profitable.It is found that opaque sales exists when the market is competitive,and at the end of the season,the total expected revenue of the airlines under the environment of competition is higher than the traditional opaque sales.At the same time,the intermediary is motivated to implement this strategy,which highlights the guiding role of dual channel simultaneous sales to market demand.Theoretical references can be provided for the pricing in competitive and channel selection of airlines.