提名董事权条款、并购概率与公司价值——基于中国民营上市公司的证据

Terms of Nomination of Directorship,M&A Probability and Company Value——Based on the Evidence of Chinese Private Listed Companies

本文以股权分置改革后控制权市场被不断激活为背景,聚焦公司在章程中加入反收购条款狙击“野蛮人”的现象,从堑壕理论和谈判收益理论出发,探究提名董事权条款在我国民营上市公司设置的经济后果与作用机制,并使用PSM等方法验证结论稳健性。研究结果表明,设置较高提名董事权比例的公司,被并购的概率会显著下降,掏空程度会显著提高,公司价值会显著下降。进一步的,较高的市场化水平与审计质量将有助于减弱提名董事权条款对公司治理的负面影响。研究结果为实务中监管部门合理引导反收购条款的设置、加强公司治理、完善相关法律提供了经验依据,同时也丰富了我国“法与金融”领域的理论文献。

With the background of the activation of the market after the split share structure reform,starting from trench theory and bargaining theory,this paper focuses on the phenomenon of the company adding anti-acquisition clauses to attack the"barbarians",explores the economic consequences and mechanism of the terms of nominating directors set up in China's private listed companies,uses PSM and other methods to verify the conclusion.The results show that companies with higher proportion of nominated directors will have lower probability of being merged,their hollowing out will increase,and their company value will also decrease.Further,a higher level of marketization and audit quality can help to reduce the negative impact of the nomination of directorship clauses on corporate governance.The results provide an empirical basis for the regulatory authorities to reasonably guide the setting of anti-acquisition clauses,strengthen corporate governance,and improve relevant laws in practice,while also enriching the theoretical literature in the field of“law and finance”in China.