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学生评教中的博弈与变革 被引量:7

The Game in Student Evaluations of Teaching and Its Reforms
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摘要 在教师的利益与学生评教分数捆绑的政策下,师生间博弈将导致学生评教分数与课程分数同时膨胀。高校间博弈将导致各校容忍自己的教师讨好学生。高校与监管者的博弈将会鼓励高校坚持学生评教政策。克服学生评教失灵的根本的解决办法是,在高校中实现从评教到教的咨询的变革。教的咨询是企业管理咨询在高校中的对应物,其本质是咨询专家向教师提供的旨在改进教师绩效的咨询服务,也是诊断、考核和发展教师绩效的持续过程,其三个基本阶段是诊断教师的绩效问题、制定和执行教师绩效改进策略,其核心是咨询专家向教师提供的咨询性反馈。建立和有效实施教的咨询制度的前提是,放弃把教师的利益与学生评教分数捆绑的政策,对咨询专家实行效率工资,为教的咨询重新设计学生评教表。 Under the policy of bundling teachers′interests with the scores of student evaluation of teaching,the game between teachers and students will lead to the simultaneous inflation of the scores of student evaluation of teaching and students′grades,while the game among universities will lead to an observable fact that universities tolerate their own teachers to fawn on students.However,the game between universities and their regulator will encourage universities to insist on the policy.The fundamental solution to the failure of evaluation teaching is to realize a reform from evaluating teachers to instructional consultation.Teaching consultation is the counterpart of the management consultation of the firm in higher education.Its essence is the consultative services aiming at improving the teachers'performance provided by specialized consultants to teachers.Its three basic stages are as follows:diagnosing the teachers′performance problems,formulating and implementing strategies aiming at improving the teachers′performance.It is also a continuous process of diagnosing,measuring and developing the teachers′performance.Its core is the consultative feedback provided by specialized consultants to teachers.The premises to establish and implement effectively the teaching consultation system are to forgo the policy of bundling teachers′interests with the scores of student evaluation of teaching,implement efficiency wages for teaching consultants,and redesign the forms of student evaluation of teaching for instructional consultation.
作者 孙鳌 孙由之 SUN Ao;SUN Youzhi
出处 《高教发展与评估》 CSSCI 北大核心 2020年第5期47-56,I0004,共11页 Higher Education Development and Evaluation
基金 广东省普通高校教育科研项目2016GXJK025 中国矿业大学(北京)教改项目(J190904)。
关键词 学生评教 分数膨胀 教师绩效 教的咨询 game score inflation teachers′performance teaching consultation
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