董事高管责任保险、管理层激励与企业创新--基于A股上市公司的实证研究

Directors'and Officers'Liability Insurance,Management Incentive and Corporate Innovation——An Empirical Study Based on the Data of A-Share Listed Companies

本文以2007-2017年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,考察了董事高管责任保险(董责险)对于企业创新的影响,并检验了管理层薪酬激励与董责险之间的交互作用。研究发现,引入董责险显著提升了企业的创新产出,且引入时间越长越有利于企业创新;董责险与薪酬激励之间存在显著的正向交互效应。在经历一系列稳健性检验后,上述结论仍然成立。机制分析表明,董责险通过提高创新效率和创新质量而增加了创新产出;董责险与薪酬激励之间产生互补效应的原因是董责险监督作用促进了薪酬业绩敏感性的提升。本研究为董责险的全面推广及企业创新激励策略的选择提供了经验证据。

Taking the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 as the research sample,this paper studies the influence of Directors'and Officers'Liability Insurance(D&O Insurance)on corporate innovation,and examines the interaction between management compensation incentive and D&O Insurance.The results show that D&O Insurance significantly increases the innovation output,and the longer the time,the more conducive to corporate innovation.There is a significant positive interaction between D&O Insurance and compensation incentive.The above conclusions still hold after a series of robustness tests.Mechanism analysis shows that D&O Insurance increases innovation output by improving innovation efficiency and innovation quality.The reason for the complementary effect between D&O Insurance and compensation incentive is that the supervisory role of D&O Insurance improves pay-performance sensitivity.This study provides empirical evidence for the comprehensive promotion of D&O Insurance and the selection of corporate innovation incentive strategies.