区块截留攻击之演化博弈模型研究

Study on the block withholding attack based on the evolutionary game

由于区块截留攻击现象的出现,对比特币网络安全性造成一定威胁,严重地损害了诚实矿工公平获益的权利。针对这种攻击行为,构建了区块截留攻击的演化博弈模型。考虑了矿工在有限理性条件下,其策略的动态演化趋势。利用复制动态推导出演化稳定策略,分析矿工在矿池不同的监管与惩罚措施下的策略选择,并对矿池的监管措施提出相应的建议与对策。实验结果表明,矿池采取相对较低频率的监管和高罚款额的管理模式,能够有效地缓解区块截留攻击的发生。

The emergence of block withholding attack poses a threat to the security of the Bitcoin system and seriously damages the honest miners′right to obtain fair benefits.In this paper,we study this attack by building an evolutionary game model to reveal the dynamic evolution trend of players’strategies and to deduce the evolutionary stability strategies with the help of replicator dynamics.We also analyze the strategy choices of miners under the different supervision and punishment measures of the pool and put forward corresponding suggestions for the pool.Finally,we conduct numerical simulation by Matlab to verify the effectiveness of our analysis by the evolutionary game model.The simulation results show that the mining pool can effectively mitigate the block withholding attack at a relatively low frequency of supervision and high penalty.