摘要
2017年,色拉布公司IPO是美国公司追随阿尔法特公司以及一定程度上追随脸书公司脚步上市的最新事例,后者存在不同类型的普通股,包括无表决权股份和超级表决权股份。双重股权结构极具争议,最近决定对主要股指如标普500指数中双重股权公司不予上市就是一个证明。另外,世界范围内证券交易所之间的竞争,最近已促使中国香港和新加坡重新考虑其上市条件,旨在吸引更多的创新技术公司。本文侧重于"新一代"控制股东一个特殊特征,即其股份"创始人特有的"性质,通常表现为公司注册证书中转换特性。一般而言,这种"转换特性"(如本文理解)明确要求,一旦某些类型的转让出现,就会失去超级表决权。本文论证超级表决权不可转让性既有积极作用,也有消极作用,并提出减少弊端的公司治理解决方案。本文论证采用广泛的比较视角,不仅着眼于传统上采用双重股权结构的法域,而且着眼于目前正重新审视双重股权结构政策的法域,以及采用强制性路径限制股份转让的其他法域。
Snap Inc.’s IPO in 2017 is one recent example of a U.S.corporation going public in the footsteps of Alphabet and,to a certain extent,Facebook with different classes of common stock,including non-voting as well as super voting stock.Dual-class structures are very controversial,as demonstrated by the recent decision not to list dual-class companies in major stock indexes,such as the S&P 500.On the other hand,competition among stock exchanges around the world has recently led Hong Kong and Singapore to revisit their listing requirements in order to attract more innovative technology firms.This Article focuses on one special feature of this"new generation"of controlling shareholders,namely the"founder-specific"nature of their shares,which is usually expressed in a conversion feature in the certificate of incorporation.In general,this"conversion feature"—as understood in this Article—stipulates that the super voting power is lost upon certain kinds of transfers.This Article demonstrates that the non-transferability of super voting power has positive as well as negative effects and proposes a corporate governance solution to mitigate these disadvantages.In doing so,the Article takes a broad comparative perspective,looking not only at jurisdictions that have traditionally employed dual-class structures but also at jurisdictions that are currently revisiting their dual-class policy and at jurisdictions with other compelling approaches toward restrictions on the transferability of shares.
作者
赵金龙(译)
武瑕(译)
Clara Hocheitner;ZHAO Jinlong;WU Xia(Hochleitner Rechtsanw Slte GmbH;不详)
出处
《经贸法律评论》
2020年第5期133-158,共26页
Business and Economic Law Review
基金
河北省社科基金项目“双重股权结构制度问题研究”(项目批准号:HB19FX020)。
关键词
超级表决权
转换特性
双重股权结构
技术公司
Super Voting Power
Conversion Feature
Dual-Class Structure
Technology Firm