合谋掏空、业绩预期与高管薪酬契约有效性

Collusion tunneling,performance expectation and the effectiveness of executive compensation contract

本文以2012-2017年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,检验不同所有权结构和控股条件下合谋掏空对高管薪酬契约有效性影响的差异性,并探索业绩预期变动趋势与变动幅度对其影响,发现如下三点结论:(1)高管薪酬与公司业绩呈显著正相关关系,证明中国上市公司已建立起有效的薪酬激励机制,其中低控股与相对控股公司高管薪酬契约有效性较强,国有与非国有公司不存在显著差异;(2)非国有公司与低控股公司合谋掏空对高管薪酬契约有效性产生显著负向影响,说明这两类公司大股东与高管合谋掏空动机较强;(3)业绩预期上升与业绩预期大增时合谋掏空对高管薪酬契约有效性的负向影响更显著,说明大股东和高管倾向于在业绩预期利好时实施合谋掏空行为。

Collusion tunneling refers to the behavior of large shareholders and executives colluding with each other to evacuate a listed company through a special agreement or contract. The prerequisite for collusion tunneling is that large shareholders give executives additional income, such as higher perks, excessive monetary compensation and higher salary stickiness, etc., and its consequences will inevitably reduce company performance and weaken the effectiveness of executives compensation contract. In recent years, the scholars have conducted some studies on the motives and governance measures of large shareholder tunneling, but there is few research on the influence of collusion tunneling on the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts, the conclusions are quite different. Some scholars believe that collusion tunneling exists in all listed companies and has significant negative impact on the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts. Other scholars have found that the motivation of collusion tunneling is weak when the majority shareholder holds a certain percentage of control and collusion tunneling has no significant impact on executive compensation contract. In addition, the existing research only confirms the influence of collusion tunneling on the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts and the differential impact under different ownership structure, few literatures discuss the moderating effect of majority shareholder holdings and performance expectations on the relationship between collusion tunneling and the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts. In fact, the degree of majority shareholder control determines the motivation and possibility of collusion tunneling, the good performance expectation is the best time for the major shareholders and executives to collaborate tunneling, which may all be impact the relationship between collusion tunneling and the effectiveness of executive compensation contract. Research in this area is very weak and needs in-depth exploration. This paper takes Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2017 as research object, and further subdivides it into two samples of state-owned companies and non-state-owned companies according to the nature of ownership and three samples of low-holding companies(the shareholding proportion of majority shareholder is less than 30%), the relative holding companies(the shareholding proportion of majority shareholder is between 30% and 50%) and the absolute holding companies(the shareholding proportion of majority shareholder is more than 50%) according to the majority shareholder’s holding degree. Through comparative research to reveal the difference influence of collusion tunneling on the effectiveness of executive compensation contract under different property structure and holding conditions, and introducing performance expectation variable to explore the adjusting effect of performance expectation change trends and change range. Using STATA 15.0 for regression test, the following three conclusions were found:(1) The executive compensation and the company performance showed significant positive correlation, indicating that Chinese listed companies have established an effective compensation incentive mechanism. The effectiveness of executive compensation contract is stronger in relative holding and low holding companies, and there is no significant difference between state-owned and non-state-owned companies;(2) Collusion tunneling has significant negative impact on the effectiveness of executive compensation contract in non-state-owned companies and low holding companies, indicating that the collusion tunneling motivation of large shareholders and executives in these companies is relatively stronger;(3) The negative impact of collusion tunneling on the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts is more significant when performance expectations rise and performance expectations increase significantly, indicating that large shareholders and executives tend to engage in collusion tunneling when the performance expectation is favorable.