基础设施工程安全监管演化博弈分析-基于前景理论视角

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Safety Supervision of Infrastructure Projects Based on the Prospect Theory

基础设施工程具有复杂性和利益主体多元性,在建设过程中易发生安全事故.为保证其质量和安全,需要建立强有效的监管机制.基于前景理论构建基础设施工程安全监管演化博弈模型,分析主要利益主体的行为互动机制及影响系统演化的因素,并运用MATLAB进行仿真.结果表明,损失规避系数、风险态度系数影响博弈三方的策略选择,安全事故发生的概率对总承包商影响显著.基础设施工程安全监管系统的稳定状态受到安全管理成本高低、惩罚力度强弱及事故损失大小的影响.政府应加大惩罚力度,完善约束机制;监理单位可通过技术创新提高监管效率,防止安全事故的发生.

As the infrastructure projects are complex and interest subject pluralism,safety accidents happen frequently in construction.In order to ensure its quality and safety,it is necessary to establish effective supervision mechanism.Based on the prospect theory,this paper constructs the evolutionary game model of infrastructure security supervision.Moreover,the behavioral interaction mechanism of major stakeholders and the factors affecting the system evolution is analyzed,and MATLAB is used for simulation.The results show that loss aversion coefficient and risk attitude coefficient affect the strategy choice of the three parties in the game,and the probability of safety accident has significant influence on the general contractors.And the steady state of the infrastructure projects safety supervision system is affected by the cost of safety management,the strength of punishment,and accident losses.The government should increase penalties and improve the restraint mechanism.Supervisory unit can improve the supervision efficiency through technological innovation in order to reduce the occurrence of safety accidents.