股东代表诉讼不起诉理由书制度对监事行为的形塑

The Shaping of Supervisors’Behavior by the Cause of No-action in Shareholder Derivative Suit

日本股东代表诉讼不起诉理由书制度通过强化监事职责,理论上有助于确保监事履职,推动公司治理的改善。但是,不起诉理由书的实务文本是何样态,该制度有何实际影响,我国尚无充分研究,甚至在日本国内也大多限于理论探讨。笔者认为"在我国的股东代表诉讼中引入不起诉理由书制度",应当"附条件"。我国应借鉴日本的经验,严防不起诉理由书制度下监事为规避责任而代表公司不当起诉董事。为纠正监事的不当起诉,提振监事信心,应对监事的判断可否类推适用经营判断原则(Business judgement rule)予以明确和规范化。

Cause of No-action in Shareholder Derivative Suit System of Japan has been a long-standing concern of Chinese academics.Some scholars advocate the introduction of the system into China as a means of curbing the malpractice of supervisors who are reluctant to sue business operators on behalf of the company.However,the studies of the basic situation and the impact of the real notice in Japan are still insufficient in China and is even limited to theoretical level in Japan.The author is in favor of introducing the Cause of No-action System into China on the condition that the system shall not only enrich corporate investigation for companies,but also improve transparency of corporate judgments for shareholders.Meanwhile,Japan’s decadal experience shall be learned to prevent the supervisors from improperly suing the company’s operators under the system for avoiding setting themselves on fire.To this end,it is necessary to clarify whether and how the Business Judgement Rule applies to the supervisors’judgment.