摘要
电商平台折扣销售期的双重折扣现象激发了巨大的消费需求,本文构建了具有折扣销售期的电商平台和商家的斯坦伯格博弈模型,研究了在电商平台不提供消费者返利和提供消费者返利的情况下商家和电商平台的最优定价策略。从消费者效用出发,结合最优化方法和博弈论,力图为商家和电商平台的决策提供参考。研究结果表明:(1)在电商平台不提供返利时,消费者的策略性越高,正常销售期的价格越高,折扣率越低。(2)当电商平台给消费者提供返利时,正常销售期的价格会升高,而折扣销售期的价格会降低,差异化定价现象愈加明显。(3)当消费者的麻烦成本高于某一阈值时,电商平台提供顾客返利时的收益相比不提供顾客返利时更高且最优利润随着消费者的麻烦成本的增加而增加。(4)拓展部分考虑了过高麻烦成本造成的消费者流失,发现适当的提高消费者的麻烦成本能增加平台和商家的收益,但是当超过一定的范围,会引起用户流失,反而损害双方的利润。
The dual discount phenomenon of e-commerce platform has aroused huge consumer demand.This paper develops a stackelberg game model of e-commerce platform and merchant with discount sales period.It studies the optimal pricing strategy for merchant and e-commerce platform with consumer rebate when the e-commerce platform does not provide consumer rebate and provide consumer rebate.From the perspective of consumers,this paper combines the optimization method and game theory,and tries to provide recommendation for the decision-making of merchant and e-commerce platform.The results show that:(1)When the e-commerce platform does not provide rebate,the higher the strategic degree of consumers,the higher the price in normal sales period,the lower the discount rate.(2)When the e-commerce platform provides consumers with rebate,the price in normal sales period will increase,while the price in discount period will decrease.The phenomenon of differential pricing is more obvious.(3)When the hassle cost of the consumer is higher than a certain threshold,the e-commerce platform provides higher rebate.In addition,the customer rebate and the optimal profit of merchant and e-commerce platform increase as the hassle cost of the consumer.(4)In the extension part,this paper considers thereaction of too high hassle cost to the user demand,and finds that properly increasing the hassle cost of consumers can increase the income of the e-commerce platform and merchant,but when it exceeds a certain range,it will cause loss of customers and damage the profits of both sides.
作者
牟立峰
王方媛
陈丽慧
MU Li-feng;WANG Fang-yuan;CHEN Li-hui(SHU-UTS SILC Business School,Shanghai University,Shanghai 201800,China)
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2020年第10期225-232,共8页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(17YJC630106)。