薪酬差距与股价崩盘风险

Executive-Employee Compensation Gap and Stock Price Crash Risk

本文以我国2008〜2018年沪深两市A股上市公司数据为样本,实证检验上市公司的薪酬差距对其股价崩盘风险的影响。研究发现,企业的薪酬差距越大,股价崩盘风险越高。在进一步研究中,本文发现薪酬差距在非国有企业、内部控制质量较低的企业和市场化程度较低地区的企业中对股价崩盘风险的影响更明显;基于中介效应模型的分析表明,薪酬差距通过会计稳健性影响股价崩盘风险。本文从薪酬差距的视角,完善了股价崩盘风险影响因素的研究框架,为我国企业薪酬制度改革与发展提供经验参考。

This paper based on the sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2018,we studied the impact of the executive-em ployee com pensation gap on stock price crash risk.The study found that the higher compensation gap between executive and employee,the higher the stock price crash risk.In further research,we found that this effect is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises,low internal control quality and marketization degree enterprises.The analysis based on the mediating effect model shows that the executive-employee compensation gap influences the risk of stock price crash through accounting conservatism.From the perspective of compensation gap,this paper improves the research framework of factors affecting the stock price crash risk,and provides empirical reference for the reform and development of China’s enterprise compensation system.