上市公司高分红、高送转是为了高管减持吗?——基于中国创业板公司的实证研究

Is Dividend Policy of“High Level Send and High Level Cash Dividend”of Listed Companies for Executives to Reduce Their Holdings?Empirical Study Based on China’s Gem

基于中国创业板公司高管在高股利分红公告前后大规模减持股票的现状,实证分析上市公司高股利政策与高管减持之间的关系。研究表明:现金分红加剧了创业板公司高管减持,具有全时效应;股票分红降低了公司高管减持,具有提前效应;两者共同作用导致高管减持加剧。进一步研究发现,高收益公司现金分红降低了公司高管减持意愿,股票分红提高了公司高管减持意愿,二者的共同作用导致公司高管减持意愿降低。上述研究表明,已有资本市场“高送转”的高管减持利益诉求逐步转化为高现金分红下的减持趋利行为,且“高分红、高送转”股利政策的深层次动机确实伴随着高管减持私利行为。

Based on current situation of large scale reduction of stocks in China’s GEM companies before and after announcement of high dividends,taking GEM companies as the research object,this paper analyzes relationship between high dividend policy and executive reduction in China’s listed companies.The research shows that,for the GEM companies,the cash dividend has aggravated the company’s executive reduction and has full time effect,the stock dividend reduces executive reduction of the company and has the early effect,and the joint effect leads to the increase of the executive reduction.Further study indicates that,the high return and cash dividend reduces the company’s executive reduction,the high return and share dividends increase the willingness of executives to reduce their holdings,and the combined effect of the two causes the reduction of executives’holding willingness.The empirical results show that demand for executives to reduce stock interests has gradually shifted from“high transfer”to high cash dividends,and the deep motivation of“high dividend and high transfer”dividend policy is indeed accompanied by executive reduction of private interests.