地方政府竞争动力与养老保险缴费负担

Competitive Dynamics of Local Governments and the Actual Rate of Endowment Insurance

基于财政分权、晋升锦标赛、官员治理的政府体制建立分析框架,使用2012—2016年79个抽样地级市的面板数据,通过双向固定效应模型分析地方政府竞争动力对职工养老保险缴费负担的影响。研究发现:地方政府的财政竞争动力、经济增长标尺竞争动力、官员个人竞争动力均能显著影响养老保险缴费负担,且财政竞争动力还能强化经济增长竞争动力对养老保险缴费负担的影响作用。3种竞争动力机制的分析显示:代表财政支出竞争动力的财政支出份额与养老保险缴费负担呈负向关系,说明财政支出竞争动力越大,政府就越可能通过降低养老保险缴费负担的方式促进企业发展,从而获取财政税收、减轻财政压力。代表标尺竞争动力的GDP增速竞争动力与养老保险缴费负担呈负向关系,经济增长竞争动力越强,地方政府越有可能采取降低社保负担的方式来吸引投资,验证了地方政府之间存在效率假说。官员个人竞争动力影响养老保险缴费负担的分析显示,市长任期、市委书记任期与职工养老保险缴费负担呈现正向关系;市长年龄、市委书记年龄与职工养老保险缴费负担呈现U型分布,顶点为54、56岁时。任期越长,官员的竞争动力越低,越不会通过降低养老保险缴费负担的方式来提高政绩。在超过晋升临界点年龄之后,官员升官无望,其竞争动力降低,就越不会采取降低养老保险缴费负担的方式来促进经济。结论表明,地方政府治理结构使中国地方政府之间存在与国际税负竞争类似的养老保险缴费负担竞争。

Based on the government system of fiscal decentralization,promotion championship and official governance,this paper establishes an analytical framework,and uses the panel data of 79 sampled prefecture-level cities from 2012 to 2016 to analyze the impact of local governments’competitive power on the contribution burden of employees’pension insurance by using the bidirectional fixed effect model.We find that the financial competition power of local governments,economic growth yardstick competition power,and officials’personal competition power can significantly influence the endowment insurance contribution,and the financial competition power can also strengthen the influence of economic growth yardstick competition power on endowment insurance contribution.The share of fiscal expenditure which represents the competitive power of fiscal expenditure has a negative relationship with the endowment insurance contribution.The competitive power of GDP growth which represents the yardstick competitive power has a negative relationship with endowment insurance contribution.The analysis of the influence of personal competitive power of officials on endowment insurance contribution shows that there is a positive relationship between the tenure of mayor,tenure of party secretary and endowment insurance contribution.The age of the mayor,the age of the secretary of the Municipal Party Committee and the contribution burden of the pension insurance of the employees all showed a u-shaped distribution,with the peak of 54,56 years old.The conclusion shows that the local government governance structure makes the local governments in China have the competition of endowment insurance contribution burden similar to the international tax burden competition.