市场化改革、地方政府投资与产能过剩治理

Market-orientedReform,Local Government Investment and Governance Overcapacity

产能过剩意味着生产要素资源配置失衡,成功解决问题的关键在于处理好市场与政府资源配置功能的合理发挥。文章利用2008-2014年中国30个省市区面板数据,从产能过剩视角,实证检验了资源配置中市场机制与政府干预的制衡关系,并采用2000-2009年数据进行了稳健性检验。研究结果表明,市场化水平的提升,优化了资源配置,对产能过剩的化解成效明显;地方政府投资规模扩大,促使产业发展脱离了合理的演进规律,加剧了产能过剩。地方政府投资规模较低时,市场化水平提升表现为对产能过剩的显著抑制作用,而随着地方政府投资规模的扩大,市场机制化解产能过剩的效果被不断弱化,负面影响逐渐凸显。

Excess capacity means the imbalance of resource allocation of factors of production.The key to solve the problem successfully lies in the rational play of market and government resource allocation function.Using the panel data of 30 provinces and cities in China from 2008 to 2014,this paper empirically tests the balance between market mechanism and government intervention in resource allocation from the perspective of overcapacity,and tests the robustness of the data from 2000 to 2009.The results show that the improvement of marketization level optimizes the allocation of resources and has a significant effect on resolving overcapacity.The expansion of local government investment has driven industrial development out of line with reasonable evolution rules,and further aggravated overcapacity.When the investment scale of local governments is low,the improvement of marketization level shows a significant restraining effect on excess capacity.However,with the expansion of investment scale of local governments,the effect of market mechanism on reducing excess capacity is gradually weakened and the negative impact gradually becomes more prominent.