“双积分”政策下纯电动乘用车核心供应商质量提升的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Quality Improvement in the Supply Chain of New Energy Vehicle under Double Integral Policy

基于纯电动汽车"双积分"政策,考虑零部件供应商质量努力水平、积分交易等因素,建立整车厂与零部件供应商组成的两级供应链动态博弈模型。研究结果表明:在"双积分"政策实施之初,当供应商质量努力敏感系数与成本系数比值过高时,建议整车厂与供应商实施分散决策的过渡策略,等比值降低之后再集中决策,这样更有利于提高纯电动汽车的质量和双方的利润。另外,建议政府对市场上的积分价格设置一定限价,避免企业因积分价格过高或者过低导致新能源车企与零部件供应商产生亏损情况。

Based on the"double points"policy of pure electric vehicles,considering the quality efforts of parts suppliers,points trading and other factors,a two-level supply chain dynamic game model composed of vehicle manufacturers and parts suppliers is established.The research results show that at the beginning of the implementation of the"double integral"policy,when the ratio of the supplier’s quality effort sensitivity coefficient to the cost coefficient is too high,it is suggested that the vehicle manufacturer and the supplier implement the transition strategy of decentralized decision-making,and then concentrate decision-making after the equal ratio value is reduced,which is more conducive to improving the quality of pure electric vehicles and the profits of both sides.In addition,it is suggested that the government set a certain price limit on the integral price in the market to avoid the loss of new energy vehicle enterprises and parts suppliers caused by too high or too low integral price.