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政治关联、内部控制与高管薪酬粘性 被引量:1

Political Correlation,Internal Control and the Viscosity of Executive Compensation
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摘要 选取2012-2018年的财务数据,研究A股上市公司的高管薪酬粘性的存在性和政治关联对高管薪酬粘性的影响,根据迪博指数的高低,将数据分为两组,衡量内部控制变量对政治关联和高管薪酬粘性的调节效应。研究发现,政治关联能够大大增强高管薪酬的粘性,而在内部控制的监督作用下,政治关联对高管薪酬粘性的增强作用减弱,高管薪酬粘性降低。 The financial data of A-share listed companies in China from 2012 to 2018 are selected to study the existence of executive compensation viscosity and the influence of political correlation on executive compensation viscosity of A-share listed companies in China.The data are divided into two groups according to the level of Debo Index to measure the adjustment effect of internal control variable on the political correlation and executive compensation viscosity.Through the study,it is found that the political relationship can greatly enhance the viscosity of executive compensation.But under the supervision of internal control,the enhancement effect of political correlation on executive compensation viscosity is weakened,and the executive compensation viscosity is reduced.
作者 何凤平 汪明娟 盛燕妮 HE Feng-ping;WANG Ming-juan;SHENG Yan-ni(Department of Economics and Management,Anhui Normal University,Wuhu 241000,China)
出处 《唐山师范学院学报》 2020年第5期98-104,共7页 Journal of Tangshan Normal University
基金 安徽省质量工程项目(2019jyxm0089)。
关键词 内部控制 政治关联 高管薪酬粘性 internal control political relevance viscosity of executive compensation
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