基层食品安全领域中的“合谋监管”——基于M市的多案例分析

“Collusion Supervision”in the Field of Community-level Food Safety Regulation——Based on the Multi-case Analysis of M City

"合谋"是基层食品安全监管中的一种常见现象。"合谋监管"可以根据食品生产经营单位的规模和实力,划分为交易型合谋、压力型合谋和情理型合谋三种类型。资源交换需求会影响到交易型合谋,成本分担需求会影响到压力型合谋,预期成本评估会影响到情理型合谋,三者都呈同向变动的正向关系。这也意味着随着资源交换需求、成本分担需求的增加和预期成本的上升,"合谋监管"出现的可能性也会增大。"合谋"是监管者在有限资源约束下寻求外部资源救济的一种重要方式。"合谋监管"对治理效果的影响,并不只是局限于经济利益方面或呈现为单边负面效应。它一方面提供了基层食品安全监管机构急需的物质资源,减少了资源损耗和成本支出,但另一方面又弱化了监管的严肃性,助长了监管对象投机规避监管的心理。在基层治理中,我们需要重视由于资源约束而引起的合谋乱象,努力构建起"亲清"新型政商关系。

"Collusion"is a common phenomenon in community-lvevl food safety supervision."Collusion supervision"can be divided into three types:transaction collusion,pressure collusion and rational collusion according to the scale and strength of food production and business units.The demand for resource exchange will affect the transaction collusion,the demand for cost sharing will affect the pressure-type collusion,and the expected cost assessment will affect rational collusion,all of which have a positive relationship that changes in the same direction.This also means that as the demand for resource exchange,cost sharing and expected costs increase,the possibility of"collusion supervision"will also increase."Collusion"is an important way for regulators to seek relief from external resources under limited resource constraints.The impact of"collusion supervision"on governance effect is not limited to economic interests or presents as unilateral negative effects.On the one hand,it provides the material resources urgently needed by the grassroots food safety regulatory agencies,reducing the resource loss and cost expenditures,but on the other hand,it weakens the seriousness of supervision and encourages the supervision objects to speculate and evade supervision.In the grassroots governance,we need to pay attention to the collusion and chaos caused by resource constraints and strive to build a new type of political-business relationship.