农村公共品提供:社会与政府的互补机制

Provision of Rural Public Goods in China:The Mechanism of Society-Government Complementarities

为了提高农村公共品供给规模、质量与效率,实现乡村振兴,政府既需要鼓励引导社会资本参与农村公共品供给,也需要提高政府公共支出的效率。本文从集体行动的角度研究宗族多样性对中国农村公共品供给的影响,包括其对农村公共品私人供给的影响,及社会与政府相互作用提高政府在农村公共支出效率的影响。基于中国21个省758个县1949—1990年前后农村公共品私人供给数据及20世纪80年代反映宗族多样性的姓氏数目和姓氏集中度数据,本文发现,姓氏数目与农村公共品私人供给存在显著负相关关系,而姓氏集中度与农村公共品私人供给存在显著正相关关系。本文还发现,社会力量有效地补充了政府的作用,在姓氏数目少、姓氏集中度高的地区,政府公共支出效率更高,具体表现在对农村公共品私人供给的促进作用更显著。

China should enhance the efficiency of government expenditure to improve the scale,quality and efficiency of the provision of rural public goods for rural vitalization.The government has started to encourage the participation of social capital in the provision of public goods in rural areas.This paper studies the impact of clan diversity on the private provision of public goods in rural China from the perspective of collective action.It explores the interactive roles of society and the government in the provision of public goods.This paper uses data on the private provision of public goods from 1949 to 1990 and data on the number and structure of family clans in the 1980s from China's 758 counties in 21 provinces.It finds that the number of family clans has a significantly negative impact on the private provision of public goods and that the concentration of family clans has a significantly positive impact on the private provision of public goods.Clan culture exists mainly in rural areas.To ease identification concerns,we first estimate the difference in the effect of the concentration of family clans on the private provision of public goods between rural and urban areas.The difference-in-difference(DID)results mitigate the endogeneity bias caused by the missing variables.We also utilize two-stage least-squares(2SLS)estimations with instrumental variables(IVs)to attenuate the endogeneity concerns.We use the civil wars between the Southern Song and its nomadic rivals and wars among nomadic tribes during the Song and Yuan dynasties to instrument for the concentration of family clans in the 1980s.The 2SLS estimates confirm the causal relationship between the concentration of family clans and the private provision of public goods.Furthermore,this paper finds that social capital effectively complements the government's role in the provision of public goods in rural China.The impact of public expenditure on the private provision of public goods is significantly stronger in areas with a small number and high concentration of family clans.Due to potential market failure,scholars generally believe that the government should provide public goods.After the Chinese Communist Party gained power after 1949,the government should have played a decisive role in the provision of public goods in rural China.Nevertheless,the role of social power has yet to be studied.This paper finds that social power is still an important complement to government power.Social power can in turn promote the efficiency of government expenditure in providing rural public goods.This paper focuses on a more general question:are the government and civil society substitutes or complements?Previous literature emphasizes the relationship between the market and the government,but there is little discussion of the relationship between society and government.Scholars generally believe that the government and society are both complements and substitutes(Polanyi,1944,1957;Rona-Tas,1994;Bian&Logan,1996;Stiglitz,2000;Li,2003;Durlauf&Fafchamps,2004;Wang,2006).Empirical evidence supports the substitutable relationship between society and the government(Zhang et al.,2007;Lu et al.,2010;Yang et al.,2011).This paper contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence for the complementary relationship between society and government.Furthermore,this paper adds to the line of inquiry on collective action in the private provision of public goods(Olson,1965;Ostrom,1990)by adding evidence that collective action does exist in the private provision of public goods in rural China.The policy implication is clear.During the transition from traditional to modern rural China,the government should use traditional social capital fairly.Regarding the supply of rural public goods,in areas with a high concentration of family clans,the government should rely on the coordination of traditional clan networks and insist on social capital's participation in providing rural public goods.In areas with a lower concentration of family clans,the government should use preferential policies to encourage social capital to participate in the provision of public goods.