自愿性信息披露越多越好吗?——基于XBRL扩展分类标准的视角

The More Voluntary Information Disclosure,the Better?A Perspective of XBRL Extension Taxonomy

已有研究表明,自愿性信息披露能够提高企业信息透明度,产生良好的经济效果。那么,自愿性信息披露是否越多越好?兼具标准化和可扩展性的XBRL扩展分类标准为研究该问题提供了契机。依据《企业会计准则通用分类标准》(2015版),文章抽取300家上市公司财务报告,手工查阅并统计扩展分类信息数量,检验其对企业权益资本成本的影响。研究发现,XBRL扩展分类信息数量越多(尤其是“政府补助”项目),企业权益资本成本越高,机构投资者持股(尤其是基金持股)比例上升会弱化该效应。结论表明,冗余的扩展分类标准会提高投资者信息处理成本,加剧信息不对称,但投资者类型不同,受影响程度相异。

The existing literatures show that voluntary disclosure improves the corporate information transparency and achieves good economic results.Does it indicate the more voluntary information disclosure,the better?XBRL extension taxonomy provides an opportunity to study this topic.Based on Enterprise Accounting Standards General Classification Standard(2015),we select 300 XBRL reports by systematic sampling,manually search and record the extension information,and test the effect of XBRL extensions on the cost of equity capital.We find that more XBRL extensions(particularly goverment subsidies)induce a higher cost of equity capital,but the increase in institutional investors’shareholding(particularly funds holding)will weaken the effect.These findings suggest that the redundant XBRL extensions will increase the information processing cost and aggravate the information asymmetry.However,the impact varies with the types of investors.