董事高管责任保险与高管薪酬-业绩敏感性

D&O Insurance and Managerial Pay-Performance Sensitivity

尽管董事高管责任保险的公司治理作用一直是学术界激烈争论的热点问题,却鲜有文献从公司薪酬契约的视角研究董事高管责任保险与高管薪酬-业绩敏感性之间的关系。本文基于倾向得分匹配法(PSM)的研究设计,在控制选择性偏误的基础上研究了董事高管责任保险对薪酬-业绩敏感性的影响。研究发现:(1)公司业绩对高管薪酬有着显著的正向影响,表明高管薪酬-业绩敏感性存在,并且董事高管责任保险能显著增加高管薪酬-业绩敏感性,从而发挥了有效的治理作用;(2)董事高管责任保险与控股股东治理和董事会治理等内部治理机制存在互补效应,董事高管责任保险对高管薪酬-业绩敏感性的提升效应在股权集中度较高和董事会规模较大的样本组中更为显著;(3)董事高管责任保险与分析师跟踪、基金公司持股等外部治理机制存在替代效应,董事高管责任保险的外部治理作用在分析师跟踪较少和基金公司持股较少的样本组中更为显著。

Although the corporate governance role of D&O insurance has always been a hot issue in academic circles,few literatures have studied the relationship between D&O insurance and managerial pay-performance sensitivity from the perspective of corporate compensation contract.Based on the research design of PSM,this paper studies the effect of D&O insurance on pay-performance sensitivity on the basis of controlling selective bias.We find that:(1)corporate performance has a significant positive impact on executive compensation,indicating that executive pay-performance sensitivity exists,and D&O insurance can significantly increase executive pay-performance sensitivity,thus playing an effective role in external governance;(2)there are complementary effects between D&O insurance and internal governance mechanisms such as controlling shareholder governance and board governance,and the enhancement effect of D&O insurance on executive pay-performance sensitivity is more significant in the sample group with higher equity concentration and larger board size;(3)there are substitution effects between the external governance mechanisms such as analyst tracking and fund shareholding.The external governance effect of D&O insurance is more significant in the sample group with less analyst tracking and less fund shareholding.This study may promote academia,regulatory authorities and financial market to deeply understand the external governance role of D&O insurance,so as to provide policy reference for the regulatory authorities to accelerate the development of D&O insurance market.