上市公司国有股权转让中的监管界权问题研究

The Study on the Delimitation of Supervisory Power of Transfer of State-Owned Shares of Listed Corporations

为降低和转移国企治理成本,国有资产监管法规将监管权力界定为出资人权利,导致建立在此等权力之上的企业国有产权转让监管制度得以随意干预企业国有产权转让而不受公法与私法的约束。当下界权不清、干预繁杂的企业国有产权转让监管机制在抑制代理问题的同时,带来了损害交易相对人利益、影响公司制度稳定、增加国企本身的费用等一系列有害后果,故应以"明权、去权、限权"的途径改革现有监管制度。

To reduce and transfer the agency cost of Chinese state-owned corporations,regulations of state-owned assets supervision and administration confuse supervisory power with national investor’s rights.As a consequence,the supervisory power can affect the results of transactions of state-owned shares without any restrictions.This extremely complex and confusing supervisory system has caused a series of harmful effects as harming the interests of counterpart,disturbing the order of corporate law,increasing the cost of corporate governance of state-owned corporations,in spite of reducing agency costs relatively.The countermeasures"reveal the hidden power,remove the unnecessary interventions and limit the authority"should be put forward to reform the current supervision system to delimitate supervisory power and prevent its infiltration into national investor’s rights.