两周期闭环供应链定价策略博弈研究

Research on the pricing strategy game of two-period closed-loop supply chain

针对制造商回收的两周期闭环供应链系统,分析由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的静态Stackelberg价格博弈模型,给出最优策略的存在条件及其解析式;构建动态Stackelberg微分价格博弈模型,从系统稳定性的角度探究价格和利润从初始态到均衡态的博弈行为;借助数值仿真对比分析静态博弈最优策略与动态博弈均衡态的关系,探究博弈系统的稳定性对价格和利润博弈行为的影响.研究表明,当博弈系统稳定时,制造商和零售商经反复博弈达到的均衡态与一次性博弈取得的最优策略相同,他们从不同的初始价格经不断博弈后都能收敛于均衡价格,且提高回收价格会降低零售商销售再制造产品的所得收益;而当博弈系统失去稳定时,将会得到与上述截然相反的结论.

For the two-period closed-loop supply chain system of manufacturer recovery,the static Stackelberg price game model composed of one manufacturer and one retailer was analyzed,and the existence condition and analytical formula of the optimal strategy were given;the dynamic Stackelberg differential price game model was constructed to explore the game behavior of price and profit from the initial state to the equilibrium state from the perspective of system stability;with the help of numerical simulation,the relationship between the optimal strategy of static game and the equilibrium state of dynamic game,as well as the influence of the stability of game system on the game behavior of price and profit were analyzed.The research shows that when the game system is stable,the equilibrium state achieved by manufacturer and retailer through repeated games is the same as the optimal strategy achieved by one-off games.They can converge to the equilibrium price from different initial price after continuous game,and increasing the recovery price will reduce the income of retailer from selling remanufactured products.When the game system loses its stability,it will get the opposite conclusion.