行政干预、晋升激励与过度投资

Administrative Intervention,Promotion Incentive and Over-investment

结合我国特有的制度背景,运用2013—2018年沪深两市A股国有上市公司的面板数据,分别使用多种实证模型,探讨了国有企业高管的晋升激励与企业过度投资之间的关系。研究发现,政治晋升激励可以有效抑制国有企业高管进行过度投资。进一步地,将行政干预作为调节变量进行检验后发现,在较强的行政干预下,政治晋升激励对过度投资的抑制作用不显著;然而,当行政干预程度较弱时,政治晋升激励对过度投资的抑制作用更加显著。通过一系列的稳健性检验以后,研究结论仍然成立。研究结论有助于揭示我国国有企业发展与政治晋升之间的内在作用机制。从国企高管的角度来看,获得政治晋升比薪酬激励具有更大的吸引力,并且其对于国企投资效率的优化也具有重要影响。

Combined with the unique institutional background of China,using the panel data of state-owned listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the years from 2013 to 2018,using various empirical model,this paper explores the relationship between the promotion incentive for executives in state-owned enterprises(SOEs)and the over-investment of enterprises.The results show that political promotion incentives can effectively restrain executives of the SOEs from over-investment.Further research,taking administrative intervention as a moderating variable,has found that under strong administrative intervention,political promotion incentives have no significant inhibitory effect on over-investment,however,when the degree of administrative intervention faced by the SOEs is weakened,the inhibitory effect of political promotion incentive on excessive investment is more significant.After a series of robust and endogenous tests,the research conclusion is still valid.This research helps to reveal the internal mechanism between the development of the SOEs and political promotion.From the perspective of executives in the SOEs,political promotion is more attractive than salary,and it has a significant impact on the optimization of SOEs'investment efficiency.