摘要
近些年来,我国企业天价并购后业绩承诺兑现情况呈金玉其外败絮其中的乱象,其中盈余管理成为并购标的企业规避业绩承诺补偿义务的常见手段。本文基于2013—2017年新三板上市标的企业样本,运用逆向思维,将期望理论应用于并购重组中业绩承诺负面效应分析,研究业绩承诺制度与标的企业盈余管理的关系。实证结果显示:签订业绩承诺显著提升并购后标的企业盈余管理水平。其中,承诺的业绩增长率以及股份补偿方式作为业绩承诺的重要条款,均对并购后盈余管理水平产生明显正向影响。进一步研究发现,标的方高管股权激励强化了业绩承诺所诱发的盈余管理水平;标的方所处的高行业竞争态势显著加强业绩承诺与并购后盈余管理的正相关关系。以上结论表明,迅速发展和广泛应用的业绩承诺制度对并购标的企业所产生的约束有限,其负面效应不应忽视,投资者应理性认识和把握;监管部门应进一步完善相关制度,促进优化并购交易业绩承诺方案和操作规范。
In recent years,the performance commitment of Chinese enterprises after high price M&A has become a mess,in which earnings management has become a common means for the target enterprises to avoid performance commitment compensation obligations.Based on the sample of target companies listed on the New Third Board from 2013 to 2017,this paper applies expectation theory to the analysis of negative effects of performance commitment in M&A,and studies the relationship between performance commitment system and earnings management of target enterprises.The empirical results show that the signing of performance commitment significantly improves the earnings management level of the target enterprise after M&A.Among them,the performance growth rate and share compensation mode of commitment,as important terms of performance commitment,have a significantly positive impact on earnings management level after M&A.Further research shows that the target side′s executive equity incentive strengthens the earnings management level induced by performance commitment;the target party′s high industry competition situation significantly strengthens the positive correlation between performance commitment and earnings management after M&A.The above conclusions show that the rapid development and wide application of performance commitment system has limited constraints on the target enterprises,but its negative effects should not be ignored,investors should rationally understand and grasp;the regulatory authorities should further improve the relevant systems to promote the optimization of the performance commitment scheme and operation norms of M&A transactions.
作者
张国珍
潘爱玲
邱金龙
ZHANG Guo-zhen;PAN Ai-ling;QIU Jin-long(School of Management, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China)
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第9期121-131,共11页
Commercial Research
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目,项目编号:20ZDA064
国家社会科学基金重点项目,项目编号:19AGL010
教育部人文社会科学项目,项目编号:19YJC630132。
关键词
期望理论
业绩承诺
盈余管理
股权激励
竞争态势
expectation theory
performance commitment
earnings management
equity incentive
competitive situation