银行业开放、外资持股与银行风险承担

Banking Openness,Foreign Ownership and Bank Risk-Taking

银行业开放是一把“双刃剑”,在提升银行风险控制水平的同时,也提高了金融风险防范的复杂性,因此,正确认识和理解开放与风险的关系对于扩大开放至关重要。本文使用2002—2017年160家中资银行非平衡面板数据,分析外资持股与银行风险承担之间的关系。所得结果更全面地支持“开放稳定”观点——由于知识溢出效应和外部监督效应的共同作用,外资持股会降低中资银行风险承担,这被更低的总体违约风险、资本短缺风险、资产风险和金融中介风险证明。这一结论在进行一系列的稳健性检验和内生性分析后仍然成立。外资股东向中资银行委派董事或高管能够降低银行风险承担,不同类型的外资降低银行风险承担的情况可能存在差异。通过更进一步的分析,外资持股通过提高资本缓冲、降低杠杆率减少银行风险承担,这主要受到外部监督效应的影响。在外资持股中资银行后,关系贷款银行、上市融资银行均面临较高的风险,处在宏观经济风险时期或制度环境较好地区的银行均面临较低的风险。

Opening up the banking sector is a double-edged sword.While improving bank risk control,it also increases the complexity of financial risk prevention.Therefore,understanding the relationship between openness and risk is essential for further opening up of the banking sector.Based on data of 160 Chinese commercial banks from 2002 to 2017,this paper analyzes the relationship between foreign ownership and bank risk-taking.The results offer more comprehensive support for the view of“open-stability”.Foreign ownership brings the knowledge spillover effect and external supervision,thus reducing risk-taking by Chinese banks,as is evidenced by lower overall default risk,capital shortage risk,asset risk and financial intermediary risk.This conclusion withstands a series of robustness tests and endogeneity analyses.Directors or executives appointed by foreign shareholders can help reduce bank risk-taking,though to varying degrees depending on the type of the foreign shareholder.Further analysis reveals that foreign ownership leads to the increase of capital buffer,and the decline of leverage ratio,thus reducing bank risk-taking.This is mainly the result of external supervision.Once foreign investors partly takes over the ownership of Chinese banks,the banks with relationship lending and listed banks will face higher risks,while banks that are in periods of higher economic risks or in a better institutional environment may face lower risks.