承诺能力与地方政府激励模式

Commitment and Modes of Local Governments

本文通过构建一个动态的激励机制,分析了制度承诺能力如何影响地方政府的均衡激励模式。分析表明,当制度承诺能力可以给地方政府足够稳定的预期,地方政府会趋于选择稳健的行为模式。此外,财权上收和事权下放,更可能引发地方政府激进式的行为取向,而相对弱化地方政府在晋升上的激励强度,在一定条件下有助于改善地方政府的激励模式。

China's local governments at all levels are the implementers of the central policy.The incentives of local governments in China come from both revenue sharing and competitive promotion tournaments.By constructing a dynamic incentive mechanism model,this paper analyzes how the ability of institutional commitment affects the balanced incentive model of local governments.When the institutional commitment ability can assure the local government enough stable expectation,the local government behavior will tend to be more stable and reasonable.In addition,the centralization of financial power and devolution of administrative power are more likely to lead to radical behavior of local governments,while relatively weakening the incentive intensity of local governments in promotion will help to improve the incentive mode of local governments under certain condition.