摘要
演化博弈理论和方法在经济学诸多领域都取得了成功,但缺乏成熟、统一的研究范式。部分国内文献混淆了种群、维度和策略的概念,将原本的单维模型按照二维模型的思路来建模。对非线性支付矩阵的多个种群仅考虑“群间”效应,忽视“群内”效应,会对建模的完整性和可靠性产生不利影响。鉴于此,文章从种群及状态、阶段博弈、复制动态和均衡四个方面构建演化博弈模型的基本框架,再对单维、二维演化博弈模型的经济学应用范式进行探讨,重点强调种群、策略、维度的概念区分以及群内、群间效应在建模过程中的方法处理,以期对有限维演化博弈模型的经济学应用范式进行规范。
Evolutionary game theory and methods have achieved great success in various economic fields,but domestic research lacks mature and unified research paradigm.In some domestic literatures,the concepts of population,dimension and strategy are confused,and the original one-dimensional model is constructed according to the idea of two-dimensional model.Only considering inter-population effect and ignoring intra-population effect on multiple populations of nonlinear payoff matrix will adversely affect the integrity and reliability of modeling.In view of this,the present paper constructs the basic framework of evolutionary game model(EGM)from such four aspects as population and state,stage game,replication dynamics and equilibrium,and then discusses the economic application paradigm of one-dimensional and two-dimensional EGM.In order to standardize the economic application paradigm of the finite dimensional evolutionary game model,the paper places the emphasis on the concept distinction of population,strategy and dimension,and on the methods to deal with the inter-population and intra-population effects in the process of modeling.
作者
李停
Li Ting(School of Economics,Tongling University,Tongling Anhui 244000,China)
出处
《统计与决策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第20期19-23,共5页
Statistics & Decision
基金
安徽省科技创新战略与软科学研究专项项目(1706a02020006)。
关键词
有限维
演化博弈模型
ESS
“群内”效应
相对适应度函数
finite dimension
evolutionary game model(EGM)
evolutionary stable strategy(ESS)
intra-population effect
relative fitness function