“双一流”建设背景下高校高层次人才的非正常流动监管——基于前景理论的演化博弈分析

Supervision of Abnormal Flow of High-level Talents in Colleges and Universities Under Background of "Double First-Class" Construction: Evolutionary Game Analysis Based on Prospect Theory

"双一流"建设背景下,我国高校高层次人才流动出现乱象,亟需政府对此进行监管,从而引导人才流动回归学术本源。将前景理论引入演化博弈模型,构建政府与高校针对高层次人才流动的收益感知演化博弈矩阵,对博弈双方的决策行为以及演化结果的稳定性进行分析。研究结果表明,高校高层次人才非正常流动的监管演化博弈存在5个均衡点,但因过度自信、风险偏好、认知偏差等因素而导致系统难以收敛于稳定点。在此基础上,提出建立"政府-公众"监管机制、构建高层次人才信息公示平台,以及高校自身坚持长远战略眼光等对策来制约相关影响因素,从而促使博弈达到均衡稳定点,实现高校高层次人才的正常合理流动。

Under the background of "double first-class" construction,the flow of high-level talents in colleges and universities is in chaos, which needs the government’s supervision urgently, so as to guide the flow of talents in colleges and universities to return to the academic origin. In this paper, the prospect theory is introduced into the evolutionary game model to construct the evolutionary game matrix of income perception between the government and universities for high-level talent flow. The results show that there are five equilibrium points in the regulatory evolutionary game of irregular flows of high-level talents in colleges and universities, but it is difficult for the system to converge to a stable point due to overconfidence, risk preference, cognitive bias and other factors. On that basis, the paper puts forward some countermeasures, such as the establishment of a government-public supervision mechanism, the establishment of a high-level talent information platform, and the need for colleges and universities to have a long-term strategic vision to restrict the influencing factors, so as to promote the game to reach the equilibrium point and realize the normal and reasonable flow of high-level talents in colleges and universities.