基于重复博弈的共享单车治理研究分析

Research and Analysis of Shared Bike Governance Based on Repeated Game

共享单车企业和消费者在共享单车管理和停放的过程中容易陷入囚徒困境,即企业不治理、消费者不规范,从而导致企业成本和消费者寻找单车的成本增加。将声誉机制和政府的监管引入博弈关系中,运用重复博弈的方法建立模型进行分析,发现双方的最优策略为“规范管理,支持”。由此出发,对共享单车规范管理提出相应的对策建议,以期避免共享单车企业和消费者走入囚徒困境,同时提高企业的收益和消费者的生活效率。

Bike-sharing companies and consumers are prone to falling into the prisoner’s dilemma during bike-sharing management and parking,that is,companies are not governed and consumers are not regulated,resulting in increased costs for companies and consumers to find bikes.The article introduces the reputation mechanismand government supervision into the game relationship,and uses the repeated game method to establish a model for analysis,and finds that the optimal strategy of both parties is“standardized management and support”.Based on this,this article proposes corresponding countermeasures and suggestions for the standard management of shared bicycles,to avoid shared bicycle companies and consumers from entering the prisoner’s dilemma and improve the profits of enterprises and the efficiency of consumers’lives.