扬德尔理论下的电子烟规制

Baptists, Bootleggers & Electronic Cigarettes

电子烟的出现给香烟、其他烟草制品以及尼古丁替代疗法(如尼古丁口香糖和尼古丁贴片)的制造商构成了威胁。他们通常会通过支持政府管制来应对此种威胁,从而抑制市场竞争。可以预见的是,香烟制造商、其他受威胁的厂商以及从烟草税中获利的政府,必然都会支持仿照《大和解协议》中的卡特尔规则,对电子烟实行更严格的管制。而那些希望遏制电子烟消费的禁烟组织也会在这个过程中起到关键作用。以上情形可以适用扬德尔理论①来解释。不同利益集团都支持对电子烟施加卡特尔规制,而结合其他领域中道德与经济利益团体结盟的情形可知,受不同利益团体共同影响而产生的政策不一定会有利于公共利益。现已有证据表明,相较于传统香烟,电子烟对人体产生的伤害更小,而且可以帮助吸烟者减少烟草消费甚至戒烟。因此,政府抑制电子烟的发展可能会损害公共利益。

Electronic cigarettes pose a competitive threat to the makers of cigarettes and other tobacco products,as well as to nicotine replacement therapies such as nicotine gum and patches.A common response to such a threat is support for government regulation to suppress competition.Predictably,cigarette manufacturers and other threatened producers,as well as the governments that earn revenue from tobacco taxes,are supporting greater regulation of electronic cigarettes that would replicate the cartel-supporting rules of the Master Settlement Agreement.These efforts are aided by anti-smoking organizations that would like to prevent the growth of demand for electronic cigarettes.This episode allows application of the Bootlegger and Baptist theory of regulation.Groups with divergent interests have aligned in support of cartelizing regulation of electronic cigarettes.As with other episodes of Bootlegger and Baptist coalitions,it is unclear whether the resulting policies will serve the public interest.There is evidence that electronic cigarettes pose substantially lower health risks than traditional cigarettes and may help smokers quit or reduce their tobacco consumption.Therefore,insofar as regulation restricts electronic cigarettes,it may undermine public health.