股东资源如何控制创业企业?一个模糊集的定性比较分析

How do Shareholders’Resources Control Start-ups?A Fuzzy Set-qualitative Comparative Analysis

互联网技术的迭代升级与商业模式的推陈出新刺激了诸多巨头公司通过并购新创企业实现市场占领,但如何控制成为其面临的难题。文章基于资源基础理论,在问卷调查的基础上采用模糊集定性比较分析归纳出不同创始人特征的情境下,外部股东利用资源实现控制的三种模式:共生融合型、创始人主动退出型、创始人和谐退出型。结合案例分析得出,股东资源的异质性并非是获取控制权的充分条件;外部股东获取控制权的关键在于利用资源的互补性优势,进行有效的资源协调以降低交易成本和治理成本。

The iterative upgrading of Internet technology and the innovation of business model have stimulated many giant companies to achieve market occupation through mergers and acquisitions of new ventures.However,how to control the start-up companies has become a difficult problem for these external investors.Based on the resource-based theory and the questionnaire data,this paper uses fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis to summarize three modes of external shareholders’control by using resources under different founder characteristics:symbiosis and integration,founder’s active exit and founder’s harmonious exit.Based on the case study,it is concluded that the heterogeneity of shareholders’resources is not a sufficient condition for acquiring control rights;the key for external shareholders to obtain control rights is to utilize the complementary advantages of resources and coordinate resources effectively to reduce transaction costs and governance costs in the path of acquiring control rights.