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发电市场长期竞价均衡自发形成过程中的一般多策略演化博弈决策行为研究 被引量:15

Decision-making Behavior Investigation for General Multi-strategy Evolutionary Games in the Spontaneous Formation of Long-term Bidding Equilibria of A Power Generation Market
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摘要 发电市场(power generation market,PGM)长期竞价均衡的形成是一个自发的演化博弈过程。为此,该文关注一般情形下的两群体多策略同质和异质性PGM竞价演化博弈。首先,对同质性PGM竞价演化博弈的相对净支付(relative net payoff,RNP)参数进行定义,并在4种博弈情形下对其进行了理论分析与动态仿真。基于此,构建异质性PGM竞价演化博弈模型,并详细定义其RNP参数。然后,对该模型在有/无政府监督下的长期竞价均衡进行定性分析,研究表明,该均衡仅由RNP参数决定,因而可调整这些RNP参数使市场自发形成期望的竞价演化稳定均衡。进一步,在按GENCos报价结算机制(pay as bid,PAB)和市场出清价格统一结算机制(market clearing price,MCP)两种结算机制下对异质性PGM的长期竞价均衡进行了定量分析与动态仿真。研究表明MCP比PAB更适合引导发电商按基于边际成本的低价进行竞价。最后,进行了展望。该文模型、方法及结论具有一定普适性,旨在丰富PGM长期竞价均衡问题研究。 The formation of long-term bid equilibrium of power generation market(PGM) is a spontaneous evolutionary game process. To this end, this paper focused on the general two-population multi-strategy homogeneous and heterogeneous PGM bidding evolution games. First, the homogeneous one was studied in four game situations through theoretical analysis and dynamic simulation, among which its relative net payoff(RNP) parameters are defined. Based on this, a bidding model for heterogeneous generators was built, and its RNP parameters were defined. Then, the long-term bidding equilibria of this PGM were investigated qualitatively in cases of government supervision and no government supervision, revealing that such equilibria are only determined by RNP parameters, thereby an expected evolutionarily stable market bidding equilibrium can be formed spontaneously in this PGM by adjusting these RNP parameters. Moreover, the long-term bidding equilibria of this PGM were quantitatively analyzed and verified via dynamic simulation in clearing mechanisms of pay as bid(PAB) and market clearing price(MCP), revealing that MCP is more suitable than PAB in guiding generators to quote a lower price according to marginal cost. Lastly, relevant research was prospected. The models, methods and conclusions in this paper are universal, which aims to enrich the research on long-term bid equilibrium issues in PGM.
作者 程乐峰 余涛 CHENG Lefeng;YU Tao(School of Electric Power,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510641,Guangdong Province,China)
出处 《中国电机工程学报》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2020年第21期6936-6955,共20页 Proceedings of the CSEE
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(51777078)。
关键词 演化博弈论(EGT) 发电市场(PGM) 竞价 同质和异性 均衡 evolutionary game theory(EGT) power generation market(PGM) bidding homogeneity and heterogeneity equilibrium
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