财政分权、所有权性质与企业税收规避

Fiscal Decentralization,Ownership Nature and Corporate Tax Avoidance

财政分权作为一种制度设计对微观企业行为产生了深远影响,然而却很少有研究对其微观经济后果进行分析。本文从分权视角切入,实证评估了财政分权对企业税收规避的影响。研究发现:财政分权的提高会降低企业进行税收规避的意愿,并在不同产权企业间表现出明显的异质性,这一结论在一系列稳健性检验后依旧存在;进一步研究发现,财政收入分权降低会增加企业税收规避意愿,而财政支出分权降低则会表现出相反的效果;同时,本文研究还发现,在不同的市场发展阶段、法律制度等多个方面,财政分权的提高会对企业避税产生差异化的影响。本文研究不仅拓展了财政分权经济后果等方面的研究,还可以为新时期政府间事权改革提供一定参考。

As a system design,fiscal decentralization has a profound impact on the behavior of micro-enterprises,but few studies have analyzed its micro-economic consequences.This article starts from the perspective of decentralization and empirically evaluates the impact of fiscal decentralization on corporate tax avoidance.The study finds that the increase in fiscal decentralization would reduce the willingness of enterprises to avoid taxation,and shows obvious heterogeneity among enterprises with different pro⁃perty rights.This conclusion still exists after a series of robustness tests;further research finds that the reduction of fiscal income de⁃centralization will increase the willingness of enterprises to avoid taxation,while the reduction of fiscal expenditure decentralization will have the opposite effect.At the same time,the research also finds that fiscal decentralization in different market development stages,legal systems and other aspects the increase in tax will have a differentiated impact on corporate tax avoidance.The research in this article not only expands the research on the economic consequences of fiscal decentralization,but also provides a reference for the reform of intergovernmental power in the new era.