基于风险偏好和公平偏好的PPP项目社会资本选择研究

Research on the Selection of Social Capital by Government Departments in China’s PPP Projects——An Investigation Based on Risk Preference and Fairness Preference

为补充政府部门关于如何选择社会资本方的理论解释,建立了政府部门与社会资本方的stackelberg博弈理论模型,分析效益最大化下政府选择何种特征的社会资本对其更有利。结果表明:不论政府方是风险中性还是风险规避,从政府补偿、激励支出及项目初始投资最优来看,风险规避度低、公平偏好度高的社会资本方是其最佳选择,能够实现社会效益的最大化,并针对提高民营企业参与PPP项目的积极性提出了管理建议。

To theoretically explain the way how the government selects social capital,a stackelberg game theory model between the government department and the social capital side is established to analyze which characteristics of social capital enable the government to maximize their benefit.The results show that,regardless of whether the government is risk-neutral or risk-averse,the social capital with low risk aversion and high fairness preference is the best choice,which can maximize social benefits.Some management suggestions are put forward to improve the enthusiasm of private enterprises to participate in PPP projects.