“二对一”结构供应链中研发型制造商的技术授权策略研究

Research on technology authorization strategy of the R&D manufacturer in a supply chain with"two-to-one"structure

在由一个研发型制造商,一个非研发型制造商和一个零售商构成的“二对一”结构的供应链中,考虑横向技术溢出效应,构建技术不授权和技术授权(包括单位产量授权和固定费用授权)模型,给出研发型制造商最优的技术授权策略。研究表明,研发型制造商的最优技术授权策略取决于产品替代性和技术溢出程度;在单位产量授权策略下,零售商的利润总是小于技术不授权策略下,而当产品替代性较小(较大)时,供应链利润总是大于(小于)技术不授权策略下;在固定费用授权策略下,零售商和供应链的利润总是大于技术不授权策略下的利润。

In a"two-to-one"supply chain consisting of a R&D manufacturer,a non-R&D manufacturer and a retailer,by considering horizontal technology spillover effects,a model of technology non-authorization and technology authorization(including royalty authorization and fixed fee authorization)models were constructed,then the R&D manufacturer's optimal technology authorization strategy was given.The research shows that:the optimal technology authorization strategy of the R&D manufacturer mainly depends on the degree of product substitution and technology spillover;under the royalty authorization strategy,the retailer's profit is always less than that under the technology non-authorization strategy,when the degree of product substitution is small(large),the supply chain's profit is always greater(less)than that under the technology non-authorization strategy;under the fixed fee authorization strategy,the profit of the retailer or the supply chain is always greater than that under the technology non-authorization strategy.