财政分权与地方政府城投债——基于地方官员激励的视角

Fiscal Decentralization and Implicit Debt of Local Government:Based on the Perspective of Local Officials Incentive

基于财政分权和公共选择理论,分析发现现行财政体制导致的“财政激励弱化”与现行政绩考核导致的针对地方政府官员的“政治激励强化”,两种并行的治理制度是当前我国地方政府城投债务膨胀的主要原因。引入财政分权、晋升压力与政绩压力,对地方政府城投债务进行了实证分析,发现地方政府城投债务是地方官员的“主动负债”行为的结果,因为随着地方官员晋升压力、政绩压力的增强,财政分权对地方政府城投债务的扩张有更大的刺激作用。对此,有效治理地方政府债务,必须从完善地方政府融资约束机制和健全地方官员晋升激励机制两方面着手。

Based on fiscal decentralization theory and public choice theory,this paper finds that the parallel governance institution is the primary cause of the municipal debt of local government expansion,which includes“fiscal incentive weakening”caused by current fiscal system and“political incentive weakening”caused by the current performance evaluation on the local officials.Considering fiscal decentralization,promotion pressure and achievement pressure,the empirical analysis on the formation of the municipal debt of local government is carried out.The result shows that the local officials“initiative liabilities”behavior leads to municipal debt,because fiscal decentralization has more apparent stimulus effect on it with the officials promotion pressure and achievement pressure increasing.Therefore,in order to govern effectively the municipal debt of local government,we must perfect local government financing constraint mechanism and improve the officials’promotion incentive mechanism.