高管薪酬粘性、融资约束与企业研发投入

Executive Compensation Stickiness,Financing Constraints and Corporate R&D Investment

企业研发是技术进步和创新的推动力,高管行为对企业研发决策的影响至关重要。以2013—2018年中国A股上市公司为样本,运用多元回归法实证检验了高管薪酬粘性对企业研发投入的影响,研究结果表明:高管薪酬粘性对企业研发投入有显著正向激励作用。进一步研究发现:上述正向影响会受到企业产权性质和融资约束的调节,在国有企业、融资约束低的企业中,高管薪酬粘性对企业研发投入的正向影响更为明显。研究结论丰富了企业研发创新决策的影响因素,同时为企业制定高管薪酬激励契约提供了经验依据。

Corporate R&D investment is the driving force of technological progress and innovation,and the executive behavior is very important for corporate R&D decision-making.Based on the sample of A-share listed companies in China from 2013 to 2018,this paper empirically tests the effect of executive compensation stickiness on R&D investment through multiple regression method.The results show that:Executive compensation stickiness has a significant positive incentive effect on R&D investment.Further research finds that the above positive impact will be regulated by the nature of corporate property rights and financing constraints.In state-owned enterprises and low financing constraints enterprises,the positive impact of executive compensation stickiness on corporate R&D investment is more obvious.The conclusions of this paper enrich the influencing factors of corporate R&D innovation decision-making,and provide the empirical basis for making executive compensation incentive contracts.