机构投资者空间集中度、外部监督与上市公司盈余管理

Spatial Concentration of Institutional Investors,External Supervision and Surplus Management

基于2007-2018年沪深A股上市公司样本,利用手工收集的投资者与上市公司之间的地理距离数据和投资者持股比例数据,本文实证检验了机构投资者空间集中度对上市公司盈余管理的影响。研究发现,机构投资者空间集中度越大,公司盈余管理行为受到的抑制作用越大,且这种影响存在显著的异质性特征。进一步的机制分析发现,机构投资者空间集中度能够通过审计监督、分析师关注对公司盈余管理形成显著的中介因子效应。总体而言,本文结果认为机构投资者彼此之间的空间关系能够对公司盈余管理行为进行一定程度的解释,这为资本市场发展机构投资者,释放监督作用提供了政策制定的经验证据。

Based on the sample of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2018,this article empirically tested the influence of spatial concentration of institutional investors on surplus management of listed companies by using the geographic distance data and the proportion of investors'shareholding between investors and listed companies.The results showed that the larger the spatial concentration of institutional investors,the greater the inhibition of earnings management behavior,as well as the significant heterogeneity of the impact.Further mechanism analysis showed that the spatial concentration of institutional investors could form a significant intermediary factor effect on surplus management through audit costs,audit units,analysts'concerns and investment bank concerns.In sum,the results suggested that the spatial relationship between institutional investors should explain the earnings management behavior of the company to a certain extent,which provided empirical evidence for the development of institutional investors in capital market and the release of supervision.