控股股东杠杆增持的治理效应——基于公司真实盈余管理的视角

The Governance Effect of Controlling Shareholders'Leverage Increased Holdings:From the Perspective of Corporate Real Earnings Management

基于2015-2018年A股非金融企业数据,从真实盈余管理的视角,检验控股股东利用杠杆方式增持股份对企业的治理效应。结果表明,控股股东杠杆增持会显著减少公司真实盈余管理,控股股东杠杆增持比例、金额和股数均会显著减少公司真实盈余管理,说明控股股东杠杆增持对公司真实盈余管理具有明显的抑制作用,从而提高了上市公司的盈余质量。此外,控股股东杠杆增持行为降低公司真实盈余管理主要是通过抑制公司销售操控与生产操控。同时,在非国有企业、内部治理环境较好和外部制度环境较高的公司中,控股股东杠杆增持对公司真实盈余管理的抑制作用更强。研究结论为保护投资者权益和稳定资本市场提供了经验证据。

Based on the data of A-share non-financial enterprises from 2015 to 2018 and from the perspective of real earnings management,this paper examines the governance effect of controlling shareholders’using leverage to increase their shareholdings.The results show that the controlling shareholders’leverage increased shareholdings will significantly reduce the company’s real earnings management,and the ratio,amount and number of shares of controlling shareholders’leverage increased holdings will significantly reduce the company's real earnings management,indicating that the controlling shareholders’leverage increased holdings has obvious inhibiting effects on the company’s real earnings management,thereby improving the quality of the earnings of the listed companies.In addition,the controlling shareholders’leverage increased shareholding behavior reduces the company’s real earnings management mainly by restraining the company’s sales control and production control.At the same time,in non-state-owned enterprises and companies with better internal governance environment and better external institutional environment,the controlling shareholders’leverage increased shareholdings has a stronger inhibitory effect on the company’s real earnings management.The research conclusions provide empirical evidences for the protection of the rights and interests of the investors and the stabilization of the capital markets.