摘要
基于行为代理理论,以2009〜2017年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了C E O权力对企业双元创新模式的影响以及政府补助的调节效应。研究发现:C E O权力对探索式创新具有正效应,对利用式创新具有负效应;政府补助会增强C E O权力对探索式创新的正效应,也会增强C EO权力对利用式创新的负效应。
Based on the behavior agency theory,this paper selects the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2009 to 2017 as samples and empirically tests the impact of CEO power on innovative ambidexterity mode of the enterprise and the moderating effect of government subsidies.Result shows that CEO power has a positive effect on explorative innovation and a negative effect on exploitative innovation,which will be moderated by government subsidies.
作者
刘鑫
赵立翠
LIU Xin;ZHAO Li-cui(School of Economics and Management,Hebei University of Technology,Tianjin 300401;School of Economics and Management,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044)
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第11期84-89,共6页
Soft Science
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目(17BGL112)。
关键词
CEO权力
双元创新
政府补助
探索式创新
利用式创新
CEO power
innovative ambidexterity
government subsidy
explorative innovation
exploitative innovation
