团体标准联盟成员机会主义行为治理分析——基于行业协会、地方政府的视角

Opportunistic Governance Analysis of Group Standard Alliance Members——Based on the perspective of industry associations and local governments

随着团体标准作为标准化体系的重要组成部分得到了快速发展,部分企业通过生产不达标产品的机会主义行为却直接损害了团体标准集体利益,同时对整个产业的发展也带来负面影响。为探究治理团体标准联盟成员机会主义的策略和方法,在文献研究的基础上,运用博弈理论分析了行业协会和地方政府在治理企业机会主义行为中的承担的作用。研究结果表明:行业协会可以利用信息披露有效抑制机会主义行为的发生,但由于其自身不具备强制性惩罚功能,无法消除企业机会主义行为发生的可能;只有在地方政府介入的情况下,利用强制惩罚才有可能从根本上有效杜绝企业机会主义行为的发生。基于上述结论,从建立声誉机制和优化监管两个方面为第三方机构治理团体标准成员机会主义行为提供实际管理中的相关建议。

With the rapid development of group standards as an important part of the standardization system,the opportunistic behavior of some enterprises through the production of substandard products has directly harmed the collective interests of group standards,and at the same time it has also negatively affected the development of the entire industry.In order to explore the strategies and methods to deal with the opportunism of the members of the group standard alliance.Based on the literature research,this article uses game theory to analyze the role of industry associations and local governments in governing the opportunistic behavior of enterprises.Research indicates:Industry associations can use information disclosure to effectively suppress the occurrence of opportunistic behavior,but because they do not have a mandatory punishment function,they cannot eliminate the possibility of corporate opportunistic behavior.Only with the intervention of local governments,the use of compulsory punishment can fundamentally effectively prevent the occurrence of corporate opportunistic behavior.Based on the above conclusions,this article provides relevant suggestions for third-party institutions to respond to the opportunistic behavior of group standard members from the aspects of establishing a reputation mechanism and optimizing supervision in practical management.