地方经济增长目标管理与企业实际税负

The Economic Growth Target Management of Local Governments and the Actual Tax Burden of Enterprises

基于对塔洛克模型的扩展,本文探讨了地方政府经济增长目标管理行为对其辖区企业实际税负的影响,发现在经济形势不变的情况下,经济增长目标愈高,辖区企业实际税率则愈低。将A股上市公司数据与其对应的地级市经济增长目标数据相匹配的实证研究发现:地方政府经济增长目标对其辖区企业实际税负存在着显著的负向影响,但进入"新常态"以来,地级市政府在实现既定经济增长目标下的边际税收激励有所下降;同时,由于财政支出压力受当地实际税负的影响较小,因而财政转移支付净流入地企业实际税率关于经济增长目标的变化较为不敏感和不显著;动态分析表明,上一年度未实现经济增长目标的地方政府,在下一年度将有更大激励降低辖区内企业的实际税负。

Based on the Tullock model,the theoretical analysis shows that the higher the economic growth target is,the lower the actual tax burden of enterprises under the jurisdiction is,given the constant condition of economic situation.In the empirical part,this paper matches the data of A-share listed companies with the corresponding economic growth target data of prefecture-level cities,and the results show that:The economic growth target of local governments has a significant negative impact on the actual tax rate of enterprises under its jurisdiction, butsince China entered the “new normal” of economy, the marginal tax incentives of prefecture-level governments torealize the established economic growth targets have declined;Meanwhile, the impact of the change of economicgrowth target on the actual tax rate of enterprises in the relative inflow places of financial transfer payment isinsensitive and insignificant because the fiscal expenditure pressure is less affected by the local actual tax burden;Finally, the local governments that failed to achieve the economic growth target in the previous year will havegreater incentives to reduce the actual tax burden of enterprises in the jurisdiction area in the next year.